Integrated food supply chains: the case of variety clubs in the fruit sector by F. Monaco et al.




, PhD, research fellow 
Guido Sali, Full Professor 
Daniele Bassi, Full Professor 
 
Department of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences – University of Milan 
 
Abstract.  
Competitiveness and economic development of the fruit sector are hampered by manifold 
conditions. In recent times, the creation of an exclusive fruit brand turns out to be a valid 
strategy to counteract such challenges. Specifically, the so-called “variety club” leads the 
sector to benefit from an organizational model that relies upon a strong integration and a 
coordinated approach amongst actors. In this sense, it is an over-structure made up of the 
several subjects of the chain, which operate under formal contracts to be provided with 
exclusive goods and services and gain individual utilities. A large array of management 
schemes differ for levels of arrangements and control, with several forms in between. As a 
result, a complex structure emerges, depicting a dense and interconnected network of skills. 
Based on the general organizational structure of clubs, the study at hand is rather a concept 
paper, aimed exploring the subjects involved. Particularly, it elucidates various subjects who 
take part in the club model, explores strength relationships amongst them and sheds light on 
their bargaining power. Lastly, some insights are given for the improvement and future 
implementation of the model. 
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Introduction 
Over the last decades, several agricultural sectors are facing diversified forms of 
integrated supply chains, which facilitate enhancing their potentialities and strengthening their 
economic competitiveness. These needs are particularly evident in the fruit sector, where 
globalization (Edwards and Schulz, 2005) determines a strong price competition for 
commodities (Gellynck et al., 2012; Linnemann et al., 2006), profitability may suffer from 
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overproductions and lack of innovation, and new consumers' expectations arise (Asioli et al., 
2016; Linnemann et al., 2006). Altogether, such factors call for an economic re-organization 
of the entire supply chain, which could adequately counteract the prevalent role of retail 
(Legun, 2015) and strengthen the competitiveness of the sector. 
Particularly, the creation of an exclusive fruit brand turns out to be a valid strategy to 
tackle all these challenges. By addressing this option, a large support to a distinctive product 
is provided, which puts into place the opportunity for dealers to obtain price premia from 
consumers. In this perspective, new organizational models of food supply chains are gaining 
pace with the concretization of the economic theory of clubs (Buchanan, 1965). Voluntary 
aggregation of subjects in this particular form, allows them to benefit from exclusive goods or 
services, and gain individual utilities. Accordingly, the so-called "variety club" is the core 
element of an organizational innovation, which relies upon a strong integration and a 
coordinated approach amongst actors (Maas et al., 2012). Nowadays, variety clubs are typical 
of the apple (e.g., Pink Lady
®
) and pear industry, but some other experiences concern stone 
fruits and kiwis. 
Unlike other forms of integrated chains, the variety club is rather a distinctive group of 
subjects involved in an enlarged supply chain, "from consumer to breeder" (Maas et al., 2012, 
p. 433). Its development is subject to the patent protection of the fruit variety, which makes 
patent holder the leading partner of the club, responsible for the coordination of the 
organizational model. Through issuing formal contracts and the payment of royalties, other 
actors involved are exclusively licensed for the use of the fruit variety and the associated 
trademark, and are required to comply with specific quali-quantitative standards. Whilst for 
other commodities chain contracts turned out to be ineffective (Zanni and Viaggi, 2012; 
Solazzo et al., 2015), the fruit sector can take advantage from them. The club model enables 
controlling quantities supplied on the market, avoiding overproduction and calming product 
price rise, contributes to a quality and differentiated supply, ensures higher remunerations, 
promotes generalized marketing of the selected cultivar (Robinson, 2011) and provides 
product for fresh consumption with exclusive and appealing features for consumers 
(Linnemann et al., 2006). Fruit branding also ensures them about all the steps behind final 
product and its quality, and aims at facilitating and governing price formation to safeguard 
chain actors (Reggidori, 2016). In addition, the possibility of joining the club for both 
individuals and their associations, highlights the link and complementarity of the club model 
with all the interventions promoting food chain integration (e.g., Regulation (EU) No. 
1305/2013), producers’ associations and organizations, cooperation between operators. Given 
the large variability of subjects potentially joining the club, different levels of complexity of 
both roles and relations amongst members can be found. Irrespective of its internal structure, 
each variety club encompasses a trademarked name, a controlled production, and/or a 
controlled marketing. Nonetheless, a large array of variety management schemes present 
different levels of arrangements and control, with several forms in between (Harsh, 2007). As 
a consequence, a marked complexity of actors emerges, depicting a dense and interconnected 
network of skills. Similarly, neither a unique reference model nor an optimal structure per se 
can be identified. Rather, every possible configuration results from strategic choices, 
according to peculiar strengths and weaknesses. 
Based on the general organizational structure of clubs, the study aims at approaching 




The scientific debate about variety clubs is largely focussed on genetic selection, fruit 
biology and protection; very scarce evidences are instead provided for what concerns their 
internal organisation. Actually, structure and composition of the club model are of current 
knowledge amongst experts, but not usually communicated to general public or addressed by 
scientific literature. In this latter regard, Sansavini and Lugli (2008) provided a general, 
though simplified overview of main actors involved. The authors depicted a general 
framework, without extensively describing the role of different subjects. Further indications 
in this sense can be found in Guerra (2012). His popular article illustrated the more spread 
club systems in the apple industry, and provided more insights into the operative role of main 
actors and the (dis)advantages of joining the club. 
 Based on such starting points, this study rather represents a concept paper, aimed at 
further exploring the composition of variety clubs. Particularly, it elucidates various subjects 
who take part in the club model, explores strength relationships amongst them and sheds light 
on their bargaining power. 
 
Club actors: strength relationships and bargaining power 
The creation of a variety club relies upon a patented fruit, selected to have unique 
features. As a result and compared to traditional food chains, the club model encompasses the 
further step of genetic selection. Afterwards, patent holder - whatever its legal form - releases 
use permissions to club members, by means of formal contracts. This way, the breeder defines 
roles and tasks to be performed by each of them, and sets clear rules to which signatories are 
subordinate once joined the club. Accordingly, patent-holder holds efficient control over plant 
propagation, cultivation and marketing activities. It does not personally deal with these 
operations; rather, indeed, its competencies supervise subsequent steps and are preparatory of 
fruit production actions and value chain creation. Its economic role, in fact, also concerns the 
prime distribution of plant material, as well as the correspondence to fruit-growers a fair 
producer’s price. 
More often, patent-holder makes use of a licensed editor, which manages contracts and 
relationships with all the members on behalf of the breeder. In most cases, exclusivity of a 
club variety involves propagators, producers and/or their associations. There is also the 
possibility of entrusting with exclusivity one or few large retail distributors, although this 
strategy has led to uncertain and contrasting results (Guerra, 2012). Licensed exclusivity is 
granted to signatories on the payment of a club membership fee and of royalties to use variety 
and trademark, which serve to cover club administration and management expenses. Such 
elements therefore represent additional costs for involved firms and farms; they should be 
regarded as annual instalments for the entire duration of the contract and may have marked 
impact on their annual budgets. 
Once fruit variety is selected, a number of nurseries are commissioned to propagate 
only a pre-defined number of plants, with no possibility of an extra-propagation without 
breeder’s agreement. Plant material is to be conferred only to fruit-growers members of the 
club, allowing nurseries to address a purchase “niche” market, with an assured product 
placement. As a consequence, this may represent a strategy for them to diversify their supply 
and benefit from a further source of income. The cost borne in sourcing plant material from 
the breeder contributes to the final price formation; however, from nurserymen’s side, no 
additional margins can be obtained on the sale price to fruit growers, as also this latter 
element is set by the breeder. 
Likewise, producers who take care for cultivation and fruit collection, are burdened 
with the costs of joining the club. In this case, they might weigh on farm budget, especially 
when grower is charged with a flat fee per kg of fruit. This is even more valid if a trademark 
is used, which requires royalties and the reinvestments into specific marketing and 
communication activities. In general terms, fruit-growers seem to be the weakest subjects of 
the club model (Guerra, 2012). Their decision-making capabilities and rooms of manoeuvre 
are strongly constrained by contractual conditions. Each producer is supplied with an 
arranged number of plants, at a predetermined selling price, to be conducted in a precise area 
and aimed at a quality production. Sometimes, fruit grower is commissioned for a production 
of desired quality, without the possibility of influencing quality criteria imposed. On the other 
hand, the lion’s share in decision making played by breeder may be affected by bottom-up 
boosts. Specifically, the usual strength relationships may be unbalanced in favour of 
producers, whenever demand for plants (and willingness to produce club varieties) is greater 
than the number available at nurseries. This way, pressures upstream the supply chain require 
an increase in cultivable quantities and amendments of contractual conditions. 
The agreement to multi-year production contracts make producers incurring into a medium-
long term investment. In first instance, this needs providing a constant quantity of fruit over 
time, and intending a substantial farming area to patented fruit variety, possibly giving up 
more profitable cultivars. Conversely, the introduction of protected varieties into the 
production pattern may create additional revenues, and joining variety club enables producers 
to differentiate their supply. At the same time, innovative products can find a collocation on a 
stable market, especially if a producer organization is involved. The presence of producers’ 
organizations, associations and larger cooperatives, would in fact enforce bargaining power, 
either when arranging contracts or managing post-harvest activities. This also favours the 
aggregation of supply and producers, which in turn could facilitate interfacing with collection, 
logistics, distribution and commercialization actors. 
Commercialization and marketing-related services cover all the post-harvest activities 
and must be operated by structures and centres members of the club, approved by the breeder. 
It can be entrusted either to dedicated companies or a cooperative made up of all operators 
authorized to produce the protected variety. In both cases, it is the only subject to which 
confer fresh product, as the exclusive licensees of marketing rights. If a cooperative is 
involved, it deals with promotional activities, and also coordinates and controls the production 
process: checking of production programs, setting of product, quality and management (e.g., 
storage and packaging) standards. 
This is, indeed, the last step of the food chain operated within the club structure. It is 
noteworthy highlighting that some subjects, although not belonging to the variety club, are 
engaged in economic transactions with it. It is this the case of distributors, which can be 
exclusive licensors, but do not join the club structure. In most of cases, variety club addresses 
large retail distribution, which ensures collecting and purchasing large quantity of product at 
relatively lower prices. Large retailers are charged with the distribution of protected fruit as 
fresh product, while under-quality fruit and non-usable wastes can be processed and still 
commercialized without indications of the registered trademark. Advertisement and 
promotion activities are emphasized to obtain price premia from final consumers, and ensure 
higher returns to both patent holders and fruit-growers.  
 
Concluding remarks 
A closed system, such as the club model, is the best way to meet demands from large 
retailers and consumers, while (i) ensuring and controlling qualitative standards of the product 
and (ii) offering certain advantages to producers. 
At the same time, the opinions of final users should be taken into account when 
establishing a variety club. Large retailers may be interested in the commercialization of club 
products because of the exclusive supply they can benefit from. Still, it allows the creation of 
a more profitable market, the valorisation of fresh fruit, its availability throughout year, as 
well as to meet consumers’ request for quality products. Consumer is in fact the key figure of 
the whole food supply chain, as their habits may contribute in the success of the club model, 
which product should satisfy organoleptic and nutrition requirements. They could also be 
willing to pay a price premium, even though the higher final prices typical of club varieties 
might not be justified by quality features (Asioli et al., 2016). 
Improvements and future developments of the variety clubs should be based on 
adequate modalities, enabling efficient management of the supply chain and obtaining 
positively positive utilities for all the involved parties. In general, all the initiatives of co-
ordination and management of the fruit chain are oriented in this sense, and can find drivers in 
the initiatives set up by regulators in the matter of integrated supply chain and cooperation in 
agriculture. All the actors involved in a club project must be willing to invest in promotion, 
information and implementation of a systematic food chain plan – though costly and complex 
- in order to establish customer appreciation and fidelity, promote communication strategies 
and overcome the limits of asymmetry disclosures. It is thus essential to establish a fruitful 
collaboration amongst all the actors and stakeholders involved in the club model (Asioli et al., 
2016). 
Such consideration can be valid for all the fruit sectors; though, a unique organization 
model cannot be generalized for all of them. In fact, both participation and actions of different 
subjects in the club are strictly linked to the peculiarities of product. Particularly, it is needed 
to implement amelioration programs consistent with the needs of food supply chain and 
oriented to the market. Features of selected varieties and the requirements of the respective 
sectors, call for developing specific skills and enhancing the role of certain subjects. For 
instance, under the hypothesis of creating a club variety in the peach sector, it will be 
necessary considering its peculiarities, in order to make the organizational structure 
sufficiently adequate. More in detail, it would entrust tasks to precise figures of the club. The 
scarce differentiation in varieties, as long as the shorter shelf-life should be addressed by 
putting in place more efforts in genetic selection, logistics and conservation technologies; 
moreover, the aggregation of supply into producers’ associations and organizations may 
enable the strengthening of competitiveness of the Italian – at least - peach sector. Finally, the 
reduced permanence of peach cultivars on the market may be overcome by programming the 
set up of orchards in manifold cultivation areas, so as to ensure production all over year. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that the configuration of variety club in the fruit sector 
reflects its needs; nonetheless, this topic is to be further investigated, especially with regard to 
the concrete utilities benefitted by each actor. Beside the popularity of the model, which can 
be considered as an evidence of its success, chain analysis of variety club is still unexplored. 
More research efforts should be put into deeply investigating the role of actors, their drivers to 
join the club, and price formation along the chain. It becomes, in fact, necessary determine the 
current value chain, to verify if an adequate utility is given to all members and identify 
bottlenecks to be overcome for a more efficient organizational model. In this sense, the 
present study represents just the first step towards a more detailed analysis of the club model. 
Considerations arisen aim at being a further stimulus to pursue research in this direction. 
Likely, a valid support could be provided by the availability of existing club structures to be 
directly involved in such kind of analyses. 
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